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Abstract— The role of multiple antennas for secure com-
munication is investigated within the framework of Wyner’s
wiretap channel. We characterize the secrecy capacity in terms of
generalized eigenvalues when the sender and eavesdropper have
multiple antennas, the intended receiver has a single antenna, and
the channel matrices are fixed and known to all the terminals,
and show that a beamforming strategy is capacity-achieving. In
addition, we show that in the high signal-to-noise (SNR) ratio
regime the penalty for not knowing eavesdropper’s channel is
small—a simple “secure space-time code” that can be thought
of as masked beamforming and radiates power isotropically
attains near-optimal performance. In the limit of large number of
antennas, we obtain a realization-independent characterization of
the secrecy capacity as a function of the number β: the number
of eavesdropper antennas per sender antenna. We show that the
eavesdropper is comparatively ineffective when β < 1, but that
for β ≥ 2 the eavesdropper can drive the secrecy capacity to zero,
thereby blocking secure communication to the intended receiver.
Extensions to ergodic fading channels are also provided.
Index Terms— Wiretap channel, cryptography, multiple an-
tennas, MIMO systems, broadcast channel, secrecy capacity,
masked beamforming, artificial noise, generalized eigenvalues,
secure space-time codes.
I. INTRODUCTION
MULTIPLE-ELEMENT antenna arrays are finding grow-ing use in wireless communication networks. Much
research to date has focused on the role of such arrays in
enhancing the throughput and robustness for wireless commu-
nication systems. By contrast, this paper focuses on the role
of such arrays in a less explored aspect of wireless systems—
enhancing security. Specifically, we develop and optimize
physical layer techniques for using multiple antennnas to
protect digital transmissions from potential eavesdroppers, and
analyze the resulting performance characteristics.
A natural framework for protecting information at the
physical layer is the so-called wiretap channel introduced
by Wyner [1] and associated notion of secrecy capacity. In
the basic wiretap channel, there are three terminals—one
sender, one receiver and one eavesdropper. Wyner’s original
treatment established the secrecy capacity for the case where
the underlying broadcast channel between the sender and the
receiver and eavesdropper is a degraded one. Subsequent work
generalized this result to nondegraded discrete memoryless
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broadcast channels [2], and applied it to the basic Gaussian
channel [3].
Motivated by emerging wireless communication applica-
tions, there is growing interest in extending the basic Gaussian
wiretap channel to the case when the terminals have multiple
antennas; see, e.g., [4]–[12] and the references therein. While
in principle the secrecy capacity for such nondegraded broad-
cast channels is developed in [2] by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner, the
solution is in terms of an optimized auxiliary random variable
and has been prohibitively difficult to explicitly evaluate.
Thus, such characterizations of the solution have not proved
particularly useful in practice.
In this paper, we investigate practical characterizations for
the specific scenario in which the sender and eavesdropper
have multiple antennas, but the intended receiver has a single
antenna. We refer to this configuration as the multi-input,
single-output, multi-eavesdropper (MISOME) case. It is worth
emphasizing that the multiple eavesdropper antennas can cor-
respond to a physical multiple-element antenna array at a
single eavesdropper, a collection of geographically dispersed
but perfectly colluding single-antenna eavedroppers, or related
variations.
We first develop the secrecy capacity when the complex
channel gains are fixed and known to all the terminals. A
novel aspect of our derivation is our approach to (tightly)
upper bounding the secrecy capacity for the wiretap channel.
Our result thus indirectly establishes the optimum choice of
auxiliary random variable in the secrecy capacity expression
of [2], addressing an open problem.
While the capacity achieving scheme generally requires
that the the sender and the intended receiver have knowledge
of the eavesdropper’s channel (and thus number of anten-
nas as well)—which is often not practical—we futher show
that performance is not strongly sensitive to this knowledge.
Specifically, we show that a simple masked beamforming
scheme described in [4], [5] that does not require knowledge
of the eavesdropper’s channel is close to optimal in the high
SNR regime.
In addition, we examine the degree to which the eaves-
dropper can drive the secrecy capacity of the channel to zero,
thereby effectively blocking secure communication between
sender and (intended) receiver. In particular, for Rayleigh
fading in the large antenna array limit, we use random matrix
theory to characterize the secrecy capacity (and the rate
achievable by masked beamforming) as a function of the ratio
of the number of antennas at the eavesdropper to that at the
sender. Among other results in this scenario, we show that 1)
to defeat the security in the transmission it is sufficient for
2the eavesdropper to use at least twice as many antennas as
the sender; and 2) an eavesdropper with significantly fewer
antennas than the transmitter is not particularly effective.
Our results extend to the case of time-varying channels. We
focus on the case of fast (ergodic, Rayleigh) fading, where the
message is transmitted over a block that is long compared to
the coherence time of the fading. In our model the state of the
channel to the receiver is known by all three parties (sender,
receiver, and eavesdropper), but the state of the channel to the
eavesdropper is known only to the eavesdropper. Building on
techniques developed for the single transmitter antenna wiretap
problems [8], [9], we develop upper and lower bounds on the
secrecy capacity both for finitely many antennas and in the
large antenna limit.
As a final comment, we note that the idea of protecting
information at the physical layer (rather than the application
layer) is not a conventional approach in contemporary cryp-
tography. Indeed, the common architecture today has the lower
network layers focus on providing a noiseless public bit-pipe
and the higher network layers focus on enabling privacy via the
exchange and distribution of encryption keys among legitimate
parties prior to the commencement of communication. As
discussed in [7], [9], for many emerging applications, existing
key distribution methods are difficult to exploit effectively. In
such cases, physical-layer mechanisms such as those devel-
oped in this paper constitute a potentially attractive alternative
approach to providing transmission security.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section II
summarizes some convenient notation used in the paper and
some mathematical preliminaries. Section III describes the
channel and system model of interest. Section IV states all
the main results of the paper. The proofs of our results appear
in subsequent sections and the more technical details are pro-
vided in the Appendices. Section V provides an alternate upper
bound while Section VI provides the secrecy capacity. Our
analysis of the masked beamforming scheme is provided in
Section VII while the scaling laws of the secrecy capacity and
the masked beamforming scheme are provided in section VIII.
The extension to ergodic fading channels with only intended
receiver’s channel state information is treated in Section IX
and Section X contains some concluding remarks.
II. NOTATION
Bold upper and lower case characters are used for matrices
and vectors, respectively. Random variables are distinguished
from realizations by the use of san-serif fonts for the former
and seriffed fonts for the latter. And we generally reserve the
symbols I for mutual information, H for entropy, and h for
differential entropy. All logarithms are base-2 unless otherwise
indicated.
The set of all n-dimensional complex-valued vectors is
denoted by Cn, and the set of m × n-dimensional matrices
is denoted using Cm×n. Matrix transposition is denoted using
the superscript T, and the Hermitian (i.e., conjugate) transpose
of a matrix is denoted using the superscript †. Moreover,
Null(·) denotes the null space of its matrix argument, and
tr(·) and det(·) denote the trace and determinant of a matrix,
respectively. The notation A  0 means that A is a positive
semidefinite matrix and we reserve the symbol I to denote
the identity matrix, whose dimensions will be clear from the
context.
A sequence of length n is either denoted by {x(t)}nt=1 or
sometimes more succinctly as xn; in addition, we sometimes
need notation the xji for a sequence xi, xi+1, . . . , xj .
Finally, CN(0,K) denotes a zero-mean circularly-
symmetric complex Gaussian distribution with covariance K,
and we use the notation {·}+ , max(0, ·) throughout the
paper.
A. Preliminaries: Generalized Eigenvalues
Many of our results arise out of generalized eigenvalue anal-
ysis. We summarize the properties of generalized eigenvalues
and eigenvectors we require in the sequel. For more extensive
developments of the topic, see, e.g., [13], [14].
Definition 1 (Generalized eigenvalues): For a Hermitian
matrix A ∈ Cn×n and positive definite1 matrix B ∈ Cn×n,
we refer to (λ,ψ) as a generalized eigenvalue-eigenvector pair
of (A,B) if (λ,ψ) satisfy
Aψ = λBψ. (1)
Since B in Definition 1 is invertible, first note that gener-
alized eigenvalues and eigenvectors can be readily expressed
in terms of regular ones. Specifically,
Fact 1: The generalized eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the
pair (A,B) are the regular eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the
matrix B−1A.
Other characterizations reveal more useful properties for our
development. For example, we have the following:
Fact 2 (Variational Characterization): The generalized
eigenvectors of (A,B) are the stationary point solution
to a particular Rayleigh quotient. Specifically, the largest
generalized eigenvalue is the maximum of the Rayleigh
quotient2
λmax(A,B) = max
ψ∈Cn
ψ†Aψ
ψ†Bψ
, (2)
and the optimum is attained by the eigenvector corresponding
to λmax(A,B).
The case when A has rank one is of special interest to us.
In this case, the generalized eigenvalue admits a particularly
simple expression:
Fact 3 (Quadratic Form): When A in Definition 1 has rank
one, i.e., A = aa† for some a ∈ Cn, then
λmax(aa
†,B) = a†B−1a. (3)
1When B is singular, we replace λ with a pair (α, β) that satisfies
βAψ = αBψ. A solution for which α 6= 0 and β = 0 corresponds to
an infinite eigenvector. Generalized eigenvalues and eigenvectors also arise in
simultaneous diagonalization of (A,B) [13].
2Throughout the paper we use λmax to denote the largest eigenvalue.
Whether this is a regular or generalized eigenvalue will be clear from context,
and when there is a need to be explicit, the relevant matrix or matrices will
be indicated as arguments.
3III. CHANNEL AND SYSTEM MODEL
The MISOME channel and system model is as follows.
We use nt and ne to denote the number of sender and
eavesdropper antennas, respectively; the (intended) receiver
has a single antenna. The signals observed at the receiver and
eavesdropper, respectively, are, for t = 1, 2, . . .,
yr(t) = h
†
rx(t) + zr(t)
ye(t) = Hex(t) + ze(t),
(4)
where x(t) ∈ Cnt is the transmitted signal vector, hr ∈ Cnt
and He ∈ Cne×nt are complex channel gains, and zr(t) and
ze(t) are independent identically-distributed (i.i.d.) circularly-
symmetric complex-valued Gaussian noises: zr(t) ∼ CN(0, 1)
and ze(t) ∼ CN(0, I). Moreover, the noises are independent,
and the input satisfies an average power constraint of P , i.e.,
E
[
1
n
n∑
t=1
‖x(t)‖2
]
≤ P. (5)
Finally, except when otherwise indicated, all channel gains are
fixed throughout the entire transmission period, and are known
to all the terminals.
Communication takes place at a rate R in bits per channel
use over a transmission interval of length n. Specifically, a
(2nR, n) code for the channel consists of a message w uni-
formly distributed over the index set Wn = {1, 2, . . . , 2nR},
an encoder µn : Wn → Cnt×n that maps the message w to
the transmitted (vector) sequence {x(t)}nt=1, and a decoding
function νn : Cn → Wn that maps the received sequence
{yr(t)}nt=1 to a message estimate wˆ . The error event is En =
{νn(µn(w)) 6= w}, and the amount of information obtained
by the eavesdropper from the transmission is measured via the
equivocation I(w ; yne ).
Definition 2 (Secrecy Capacity): A secrecy rate R is
achievable if there exists a sequence of (2nR, n) codes such
that Pr(En)→ 0 and I(w ; yne )/n→ 0 as n→∞. The secrecy
capacity is the supremum of all achievable secrecy-rates.
Note that our notion of secrecy capacity follows [1]–[3] in
requiring a vanishing per-symbol mutual information for the
eavesdropper’s channel (hence the normalization by n in Def-
inition 2). Practically, this means that while the eavesdropper
is unable to decode any fixed fraction of the message bits, it
does not preclude the possibility of decoding a fixed number
(but vanishing fraction) of the message bits.
Maurer and Wolf [15] (see also [16]) have observed that
for discrete memoryless channels, the secrecy capacity is not
reduced even when one imposes the stronger requirement that
I(w ; yne ) → 0 as n → ∞. However, we remark in advance
that it remains an open question whether a similar result holds
for the Gaussian case of interest in this work.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
The MISOME wiretap channel is a nondegraded broadcast
channel. In Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [2], the secrecy capacity of the
nondegraded discrete memoryless broadcast channel pyr,ye|x is
expressed in the form
C = max
pu,px|u
I(u; yr)− I(u; ye), (6)
where u is an auxiliary random variable over a certain alphabet
that satisfies the Markov relation u ↔ x ↔ (yr, ye). Moreover,
the secrecy capacity (6) readily extends to the continuous
alphabet case with a power constraint, so it also gives a
characterization of the MISOME channel capacity.
Rather than attempting to solve for the optimal choice of u
and px|u in (6) directly to evaluate this capacity,3 we consider
an indirect approach based on a useful upper bound as the
converse, which we describe next. We note in advance that, as
described in [10], our upper bound has the added benefit that
it extends easily to the MIMOME case (i.e., when the receiver
has multiple antennas).
A. Upper Bound on Achievable Rates
A key result is the following upper bound, which we derive
in Section V.
Theorem 1: An upper bound on the secrecy capacity for the
MISOME channel model is
R+ = min
Kφ∈Kφ
max
KP∈KP
R+(KP ,Kφ), (7)
where R+(KP ,Kφ) = I(x; yr|ye) with x ∼ CN(0,KP ) and
KP ,
{
KP
∣∣∣∣∣ KP  0, tr(KP ) ≤ P
}
, (8)
and where [
zr
ze
]
∼ CN(0,Kφ) (9)
with
Kφ ,
{
Kφ
∣∣∣∣∣ Kφ =
[
1 φ†
φ I
]
, Kφ  0
}
=
{
Kφ
∣∣∣∣∣ Kφ =
[
1 φ†
φ I
]
, ‖φ‖ ≤ 1
}
.
(10)
To obtain this bound, we consider a genie-aided channel in
which the eavesdropper observes ye but the receiver observes
both yr and ye . Such a channel clearly has a capacity larger
than the original channel. Moreover, since it is a degraded
broadcast channel, the secrecy capacity of the genie-aided
channel can be easily derived and is given by (cf. [1])
max I(x; yr|ye) where the maximum is over the choice of
input distributions. As we will see, it is straightforward to
establish that the maximizing input distribution is Gaussian
(in contrast to the original channel).
Next, while the secrecy capacity of the original channel
depends only on the marginal distributions pyr|x and pye|x (see,
e.g., [2]), mutual information I(x; yr|ye) for the genie-aided
channel depends on the joint distribution pyr,ye|x. Accordingly
we obtain the tightest such upper bound by finding the
joint distribution (having the required marginal distributions),
whence (7).
The optimization (7) can be carried out analytically, yielding
an explicit expression, as we now develop.
3The direct approach is explored in, e.g., [11] and [12], where the difficulty
of performing this optimization is reported even when restricting px|u to be
singular (a deterministic mapping) and/or the input distribution to be Gaussian.
4B. MISOME Secrecy Capacity
The upper bound described in the preceding section is
achievable, yielding the MISOME channel capacity. Specif-
ically, we have the following theorem, which we prove in
Section VI-A.
Theorem 2: The secrecy capacity of the channel (4) is
C(P ) =
{
logλmax
(
I+ Phrh
†
r , I+ PH
†
eHe
)}+
, (11)
with λmax denoting the largest generalized eigenvalue of its
argument pair. Furthermore, the capacity is obtained by beam-
forming (i.e., signaling with rank one covariance) along the
direction ψmax of the4 generalized eigenvector corresponding
to λmax with an encoding of the message using a code for the
scalar Gaussian wiretap channel.
We emphasize that the beamforming direction in Theorem 2
for achieving capacity will in general depend on all of the
target receiver’s channel hr, the eavesdropper’s channel He,
and the SNR (P ).
In the high SNR regime, the MISOME capacity (11) ex-
hibits one of two possible behaviors, corresponding to whether
lim
P→∞
C(P ) =
{
logλmax
(
hrh
†
r ,H
†
eHe
)}+
, (12)
is finite or infinite, which depends on whether or not hr has a
component in the null space of He. Specifically, we have the
following corollary, which we prove in Section VI-B.
Corollary 1: The high SNR asymptote of the secrecy ca-
pacity (11) takes the form
lim
P→∞
C(P ) = {logλmax(hrh†r ,H†eHe)}+<∞ if H⊥e hr=0,
(13a)
lim
P→∞
[C(P )− logP ] = log ‖H⊥e hr‖2 if H⊥e hr 6= 0,
(13b)
where H⊥e denotes the projection matrix onto the null space
of He.5
This behavior can be understood rather intuitively. In par-
ticular, when H⊥e hr = 0, as is typically the case when the
eavesdropper uses enough antennas (ne ≥ nt) or the intended
receiver has an otherwise unfortunate channel, the secrecy
capacity is SNR-limited. In essence, while more transmit
power is advantageous to communication to the intended
receiver, it is also advantageous to the eavesdropper, resulting
in diminishing returns.
By contrast, when H⊥e hr 6= 0, as is typically the case
when, e.g., the eavesdropper uses insufficiently many antennas
(ne < nt) unless the eavesdropper has an otherwise unfor-
tunate channel, the transmitter is able to steer a null to the
eavesdropper without simultaneously nulling the receiver and
thus capacity grows by 1 b/s/Hz with every 3 dB increase in
transmit power as it would if there were no eavesdropper to
contend with.
The MISOME capacity (11) is also readily specialized to
the low SNR regime, as we develop in Section VI-C, and takes
the following form.
4If there is more than one generalized eigenvector for λmax, we choose
any one of them.
5That is, the columns of H⊥
e
constitute an orthogonal basis for the null
space of He.
Corollary 2: The low SNR asymptote of the secrecy capac-
ity is
lim
P→0
C(P )
P
=
1
ln 2
{λmax(hrh†r −H†eHe)}+. (14)
In this low SNR regime, the direction of optimal beamform-
ing vector approaches the (regular) eigenvector corresponding
to the largest (regular) eigenvalue of hrh†r − H†eHe. Note
that the optimal direction is in general not along hr.6 Thus,
ignoring the eavesdropper is in general not an optimal strategy
even at low SNR.
C. Eavesdropper-Ignorant Coding: Masked Beamforming
In our basic model the channel gains are fixed and known to
all the terminals. Our capacity-achieving scheme in Theorem 2
uses the knowledge of He for selecting the beamforming
direction. However, in many applications it may be difficult
to know the eavesdropper’s channel. Accordingly, in this
section we analyze a simple alternative scheme that uses
only knowledge of hr in choosing the transmit directions, yet
achieves near-optimal performance in the high SNR regime.
The scheme we analyze is a masked beamforming scheme
described in [4], [5]. In this scheme, the transmitter signals
isotropically (i.e., with a covariance that is a scaled identity
matrix), and as such can be naturally viewed as a “secure
space-time code.” More specifically, it simultaneously trans-
mits the message (encoded using a scalar Gaussian wiretap
code) in the direction corresponding to the intended receiver’s
channel hr while transmitting synthesized spatio-temporal
white noise in the orthogonal subspace (i.e., all other direc-
tions).
The performance of masked beamforming is given by the
following proposition, which is proved in Section VII-A.
Proposition 1 (Masked Beamforming Secrecy Rate): A
rate achievable by the masked beamforming scheme for the
MISOME channel is
RMB(P ) ={
logλmax
(
P
nt
hrh
†
r , I+
P
nt
H†eHe
)
+log
(
1+
nt
P‖hr‖2
)}+
.
(15)
While the rate (15) is, in general, suboptimal, it asymp-
totically near-optimal in the following sense, as developed in
Section VII-B.
Theorem 3: The rate RMB(P ) achievable by masked beam-
forming scheme for the MISOME case [cf. (15)] satisfies
lim
P→∞
[
C
(
P
nt
)
−RMB(P )
]
= 0. (16)
From the relation in (16) we note that, in the high SNR
regime, the masked beamforming scheme achieves a rate
of C(P/nt), where nt is the number of transmit antennas.
Combining (16) with (13), we see that the asymptotic masked
6The optimal direction is hr in some special cases, such as if hr happens
to be an eigenvector of H†eHe. The latter happens when, e.g., the nt columns
of He are orthogonal and have the same norm.
5beamforming loss is at most lognt b/s/Hz, or equivalently
10 log10 nt dB in SNR. Specifically,
lim
P→∞
[C(P )−RMB(P )] =
{
lognt, H
⊥
e hr 6= 0
0, H⊥e hr = 0.
(17)
That at least some loss (if vanishing) is associated with the
masked beamforming scheme is expected, since the capacity-
achieving scheme performs beamforming to concentrate the
transmission along the optimal direction, whereas the masked
beamforming scheme uses isotropic inputs.
As one final comment, note that although the covariance
structure of the masked beamforming transmission does not
depend on the eavesdropper’s channel, the rate of the base
(scalar Gaussian wiretap) code does, as (15) reflects. In
practice, the selection of this rate determines an insecurity
zone around the sender, whereby the transmission is secure
from eavesdroppers outside this zone, but insecure from ones
inside.
D. Example
In this section, we illustrate the preceding results for a
typical MISOME channel. In our example, there are nt = 2
transmit antennas, and ne = 2 eavesdropper antennas. The
channel to the receiver is
hr =
[
0.0991 + j0.8676 1.0814− j1.1281]T ,
while the channel to the eavesdropper is
He,1 =
[
0.3880 + j1.2024 −0.9825+ j0.5914
0.4709− j0.3073 0.6815− j0.2125
]
, (18)
where j =
√−1.
Fig. 1 depicts communication rate as a function of SNR.
The upper and lower solid curves depict the secrecy capacity
(11) when the eavesdropper is using one or both its antennas,
respectively.7 As the curves reflect, when the eavesdropper has
only a single antenna, the transmitter can securely communi-
cate at any desired rate to its intended receiver by using enough
power. However, by using both its antennas, the eavesdropper
caps the rate at which the transmitter can communicate se-
curely regardless of how much power it has available. Note
that the lower and upper curves are representative of the cases
where H⊥e hr is, and is not 0, respectively.
Fig. 1 also shows other curves of interest. In particular, using
dotted curves we superimpose the secrecy capacity high-SNR
asymptotes as given by (13). As is apparent, these asymptotes
can be quite accurate approximations even for moderate values
of SNR. Finally, using dashed curves we show the rate (15)
achievable by the masked beamforming coding scheme, which
doesn’t use knowledge of the eavesdropper channel. Consistent
with (17), the loss in performance at high SNR approaches 3
dB when the eavesdropper uses only one of its antennas, and
0 dB when it uses both. Again, these are good estimates of the
performance loss even at moderate SNR. Thus the penalty for
ignorance of the eavesdropper’s channel can be quite small in
practice.
7When a single eavesdropper antenna is in use, the relevant channel
corresponds to the first row of (18).
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Fig. 1. Performance over an example MISOME channel with nt = 2 transmit
antennas. The successively lower solid curves give the secrecy capacity for
ne = 1 and ne = 2 eavesdropper antennas, respectively and the dotted
curves indicat the corresponding high-SNR asymptote. The dashed curves
give the corresponding rates achievable by masked beamforming, which does
not require the transmitter to have knowledge of the eavesdropper’s channel.
E. Scaling Laws in the Large System Limit
Our analysis in Section IV-B of the scaling behavior of
capacity with SNR in the high SNR limit with a fixed number
of antennas in the system yielded several useful insights into
secure space-time coding systems. In this section, we develop
equally valuable insights from a complementary scaling. In
particular, we consider the scaling behavior of capacity with
the number of antennas in the large system limit at a fixed
SNR.
One convenient feature of such analysis is that for many
large ensembles of channel gains, almost all randomly drawn
realizations produce the same capacity asymptotes. For our
analysis, we restrict our attention to an ensemble correspond-
ing to Rayleigh fading in which hr and He are independent,
and each has i.i.d. CN(0, 1) entries. The realization from the
ensemble is known to all terminals prior to communication.
In anticipation of our analysis, we make the dependency
of secrecy rates on the number of transmit and eavesdropper
antennas explicit in our notation (but leave the dependency
on the realization of hr and He implicit). Specifically, we
now use C(P, nt, ne) to denote the secrecy capacity, and
RMB(P, nt, ne) to denote the rate of the masked beamforming
scheme. With this notation, the scaled rates of interest are
C˜(γ, β) = lim
nt→∞
C (P =γ/nt, nt, ne=βnt) , (19a)
and
R˜MB(γ, β) = lim
nt→∞
RMB(P =γ, nt, ne=βnt). (19b)
Our choice of scalings ensures that the C˜(γ, β) and
R˜MB(γ, β) are not degenerate. In particular, note that the
capacity scaling (19a) involves an SNR normalization. In
particular, the transmitted power P is reduced as the number
of transmitter antennas nt grows so as to keep the received
SNR remains fixed (at specified value γ) independent of nt.
However, the scaling (19b) is not SNR normalized in this way.
6This is because the masked beamforming already suffers a
nominal factor of nt SNR loss [cf. (16)] relative to a capacity-
achieving system.
In what follows, we do not attempt an exact evaluation of the
secrecy rates for our chosen scalings. Rather we find compact
lower and upper bounds that are tight in the high SNR limit.
We begin with our lower bound, which is derived in
Section VIII-B.
Theorem 4 (Scaling Laws): The asymptotic secrecy capac-
ity satisfies
C˜(γ, β)
a.s.≥ {log ξ(γ, β)}+ , (20)
where
ξ(γ,β) =
γ − 1
4
[√
1+γ
(
1+
√
β
)2
−
√
1+γ
(
1−
√
β
)2]2
.
(21)
Furthermore, the same bound holds for the corresponding
asymptotic masked beamforming rate, i.e.,
R˜MB(γ, β)
a.s.≥ {log ξ(γ, β)}+ . (22)
Since the secrecy rates increase monotonically with SNR,
the infinite-SNR rates constitute a useful upper bound. As
derived in Section VIII-C, this bound is as follows.
Theorem 5: The asymptotic secrecy capacity satisfies
C˜(γ, β) ≤ lim
nt→∞
lim
P→∞
C(P, nt, βnt)
a.s.
= C˜(∞, β) ,


0 β ≥ 2
− log(β − 1) 1 < β < 2
∞ β ≤ 1.
(23)
Furthermore, the right hand side of (23) is also an upper bound
on R˜MB(γ, β), i.e.,
R˜MB(γ, β) ≤ lim
nt→∞
lim
P→∞
RMB(P, nt, βnt)
a.s.
= C˜(∞, β) (24)
Note that it is straightforward to verify that the lower bound
(20) is tight at high SNR, i.e., that, for all β,
{log ξ(∞, β)}+ = C˜(∞, β). (25)
The same argment confirms the corresponding behavior for
masked beamforming.
Our lower and upper bounds of Theorem 4 and Theorem 5,
respectively, are depicted in Fig. 2. In particular, we plot rate
as a function of the antenna ratio β for various values of the
SNR γ.
As Fig. 2 reflects, there are essentially three main regions
of behavior, the boundaries between which are increasingly
sharp with increasing SNR. First, for β < 1 the eavesdropper
has proportionally fewer antennas than the sender, and thus is
effectively thrwarted. It is in this regime that the transmitter
can steer a null to the eavesdropper and achieve any desired
rate to the receiver by using enough power.
Second, for 1 ≤ β < 2 the eavesdropper has proportionally
more antennas than the sender, and thus can cap the secure rate
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Fig. 2. Secrecy capacity bounds in the large system limit. The solid red
curve is the high SNR secrecy capacity, which is an upper bound on the
for finite SNR. The progressively lower dashed curves are lower bounds on
the asymptotic secrecy capacity (and masked beamforming secrecy rate). The
channel realizations are fixed but drawn at random according to Gaussian
distribution.
achievable to the receiver regardless of how much power the
transmitter has available. For instance, when the transmitter
has 50% more antennas than the eavesdropper (β = 1.5), the
sender is constrained to a maximum secure rate no more than 1
b/s/Hz. Moreover, if the sender is sufficiently limited in power
that the received SNR is at most, say, 10 dB, the maximum
rate is less than 1/2 b/s/Hz.
We emphasize that these results imply the eavesdropper is at
a substantial disadvantage compared to the intended receiver
when the number of tranmitter antennas is chosen to be large.
Indeed, the intended receiver needs only a single antenna to
decode the message, while the eavesdropper needs a large
number of antennas to constrain the transmission.
Finally, for β ≥ 2 the eavesdropper is able to entirely
prevent secure communication (drive the secrecy capacity to
zero) even if the transmitter has unlimited power available.
Useful intuition for this phenomenon is obtained from con-
sideration of the masked beamforming scheme, in which the
sender transmits the signal of interest in the direction of hr and
synthesized noise in the nt − 1 directions orthogonal to hr.
With such a transmission, the intended receiver experiences
a channel gain of ‖hr‖2P/nt. In the high SNR regime,
the eavesdropper must cancel the synthesized noise, which
requires at least nt − 1 receive antennas. Moreover, after
canceling the noise it must have the “beamforming gain” of
nt so its channel quality is of the same order as that of
the intended receiver. This requires having at least nt more
antennas. Thus at least 2nt − 1 antennas are required by
the eavesdropper to guarantee successful interception of the
transmission irrespective of the power used, which corresponds
to β ≥ 2 as nt →∞.
F. Capacity Bounds in Fading
Thus far we have focused on the scenarios where the
receiver and eavesdropper channels are fixed for the duration
n of the message transmission. In this section, we briefly
7turn our attention to the case of time-varying channels—
specifically, the case of fast fading where there are many
channel fluctuations during the course of transmission. In
particular, we consider a model in which hr(t) and He(t) are
temporally and spatially i.i.d. sequences that are independent
of one another and have CN(0, 1) elements, corresponding to
Rayleigh fading.
In our model, hr(t) is known (in a causal manner) to all
the three terminals, but only the eavesdropper has knowledge
of He(t). Accordingly, the channel model is, for t = 1, 2, . . .,
yr(t) = h
†
r(t)x(t) + zr(t)
ye(t) = He(t)x(t) + ze(t).
(26)
The definition of the secrecy rate and capacity is as in
Definition 2, with the exception that the equivocation I(w ; yne )
is replaced with I(w ; yne ,Hne |hnr ), which takes into account the
channel state information at the different terminals.
For this model we have the following nontrivial upper and
lower bounds on the secrecy capacity, which are developed in
Section IX. The upper bound is developed via the same genie-
aided channel analysis used in the proof of Theorem 2, but
with modifications to account for the presence of fading. The
lower bound is achieved by the adaptive version of masked
beamforming described in [4].
Theorem 6: The secrecy capacity for the MISOME fast
fading channel (26) is bounded by
CFF(P, nt, ne) ≥ max
ρ(·)∈PFF
E [RFF,−(hr,He, ρ(·))] , (27a)
CFF(P, nt, ne) ≤ max
ρ(·)∈PFF
E [RFF,+(hr,He, ρ(·))] , (27b)
where PFF is the set of all valid power allocations, i.e.,
PFF =
{
ρ(·)
∣∣ ρ(·) ≥ 0, E[ρ(hr)] ≤ P}, (28)
and
RFF,−(hr,He, ρ(·)) ,
log
(
ρ(hr)
nt
h†r
[
I+
ρ(hr)
nt
H†eHe
]−1
hr
)
+ log
(
1 +
nt
ρ(hr)‖hr‖2
)
. (29a)
RFF,+(hr,He, ρ(·)) ,{
logλmax(I+ ρ(hr)hrh
†
r , I+ ρ(hr)H
†
eHe)
}+
,
(29b)
In general, our upper and lower bounds do not coincide.
Indeed, even in the case of single antennas at all terminals
(nt = ne = 1), the secrecy capacity for the fading channel is
unknown, except in the case of large coherence period [8].
However, based on our scaling analysis in Section IV-E,
there is one regime in which the capacity can be calculated:
in the limit of both high SNR and a large system. Indeed,
since (22) and (23) hold for almost every channel realization,
we have the following proposition, whose proof is provided
in Section IX-C.
Proposition 2: The secrecy capacity of the fast fading chan-
nel satisfies
lim
nt→∞
CFF(P =γ, nt, ne=βnt)≥{log ξ(γ, β)}+ , (30)
where ξ(·, ·) is as defined in (21), and
lim
nt→∞
CFF(P =γ, nt, ne=βnt)≤C˜(∞, β) (31)
with the C˜(∞, β) as given in (23).
Finally, via (25) we see that (30) and (31) converge as γ →∞.
This concludes our statement of the main results. The
following sections are devoted to the proofs of these results
and some further discussion.
V. UPPER BOUND DERIVATION
In this section we prove Theorem 1. We begin with the
following lemma, which establishes that the capacity of genie-
aided channel is an upper bound on the channel of interest.
A proof is provided in Appendix I, and closely follows the
general converse of Wyner [1], but differs in that the latter
was for discrete channels and thus did not incorporate a power
constraint.
Lemma 1: An upper bound on the secrecy capacity of the
MISOME wiretap channel is
C ≤ max
px∈P
I(x; yr|ye), (32)
where P is the set of all probability distributions that satisfy
E[‖x‖2] ≤ P .
Among all such bounds, we can choose that corresponding
to the noises (zr, ze) being jointly Gaussian (they are already
constrained to be marginally Gaussian) with a covariance
making the bound as small as possible. Then, provided the
maximizing distribution in (32) is Gaussian, we can express
the final bound in the form (7)
It thus remains only to show that the maximizing distribu-
tion is Gaussian.
Lemma 2: For each Kφ ∈ Kφ, the distribution px maxi-
mizing I(x; yr|ye) is Gaussian.
Proof: Since
I(x; yr|ye) = h(yr|ye)− h(zr|ze),
and the second term does not depend on px, it suffices to
establish that h(yr|ye) is maximized when x is Gaussian.
To this end, let αLMMSEye denote the linear minimum
mean-square error (MMSE) estimator of yr from ye, and
λLMMSE the corresponding mean-square estimation error. Re-
call that
αLMMSE = (h
†
rKPH
†
e + φ
†)(I+HeKPH
†
e)
−1, (33)
λLMMSE = 1 + h
†
rKPhr
− (h†rKPH†e+φ†)(I+HeKPH†e)−1(φ+HeKPhr)
(34)
depend on the input and noise distributions only through their
(joint) second-moment characterization, i.e.,
KP = cov x, Kφ =
[
1 φ†
φ I
]
= cov
[
zr
ze
]
. (35)
8Proceeding, we have
h(yr|ye) = h(yr − αLMMSEye|ye) (36)
≤ h(yr − αLMMSEye) (37)
≤ log 2pieλLMMSE, (38)
where (36) holds because adding a constant doesn’t change
entropy, (37) holds because conditioning only reduces differ-
ential entropy, and (38) is the maximum entropy bound on
differential entropy expressed in terms of
var e = λLMMSE, (39)
where e is the estimation error
e = (yr −αLMMSEye) . (40)
It remains only to verify that the above inequalities are tight
for a Gaussian distribution. To see this, note that (37) holds
with equality when x is Gaussian (and thus (yr, ye) are jointly
Gaussian) since in this case e is the (unconstrained) MMSE
estimation error and is therefore independent of the “data” ye.
Furthermore, note that in this case (38) holds with equality
since the Gaussian distribution maximizes differential entropy
subject to a variance constraint.
VI. MISOME SECRECY CAPACITY DERIVATION
In this section we derive the MISOME capacity and its high
and low SNR asymptotes.
A. Proof of Theorem 2
Achievability of (11) follows from evaluating (6) with the
particular choices
u ∼ CN(0, P ), x = ψmaxu, (41)
where ψmax is as defined in Theorem 2. With this choice of
parameters,
I(u;yr)− I(u; ye)
= I(x; yr)− I(x; ye), (42)
= log
(
1 + P |h†rψmax|2
)− log (1 + P‖Heψmax‖2)
(43)
= log
ψ†max(I+ Phrh
†
r)ψmax
ψ
†
max(I+ PH
†
eHe)ψmax
= logλmax(I+ Phrh
†
r , I+ PH
†
eHe), (44)
where (42) follows from the fact that x is a deterministic
function of u, (43) follows from the choice of x and u in
(41), and (44) follows from the variational characterization of
generalized eigenvalues (2).
We next show a converse—that rates greater than (11) are
not achievable using our upper bound. Specifically, we show
that (11) corresponds to our upper bound expression (7) in
Theorem 1.
It suffices to show that a particular choice of φ that is
admissible (i.e., such that Kφ ∈ Kφ) minimizes (7). We can
do this by showing that
max
KP∈KP
R+(KP ,Kφ) (45)
with the chosen φ corresponds to (11).
Since only the first term on the right hand side of
R+(KP ,Kφ) = I(x; yr|ye) = h(yr|ye)− h(zr|ze)
depends on KP , we can restrict our attention to maximizing
this first term with respect to KP .
Proceeding, exploiting that all variables are jointly Gaus-
sian, we express this first term in the form of the optimization
h(yr|ye) = min
θ∈Cne
h(yr − θ†ye) (46)
= min
θ∈Cne
h((hr −H†eθ)†x+ zr − θ†ze)
= min
θ∈Cne
log
[
(hr −H†eθ)†KP (hr −H†eθ)
+ 1 + ‖θ‖2 − 2Re{θ†φ}],
and bound its maximimum over KP according to
max
KP∈KP
h(yr|ye)
= max
KP∈KP
min
θ∈Cne
log
[
(hr −H†eθ)†KP (hr −H†eθ)
+ 1 + ‖θ‖2 − 2Re{θ†φ}]
≤ min
θ∈Cne
max
KP∈KP
log
[
(hr −H†eθ)†KP (hr −H†eθ)
+ 1 + ‖θ‖2 − 2Re{θ†φ}]
= min
θ∈Cne
log
[
P‖hr−H†eθ‖2+1+‖θ‖2−2Re{θ†φ}
]
,
(47)
where (47) follows by observing that a rank one KP maxi-
mizes the quadratic form (hr −H†eθ)†KP (hr −H†eθ).
Note that directly verifying that rank one covariance max-
imizes the term h(yr|ye) appears difficult. The above elegant
derivation between (46) and (47) was suggested to us by
Yonina C. Eldar and Ami Wiesel. In the literature, this line
of reasoning has been used in deriving an extremal character-
ization of the Schur complement of a matrix (see e.g., [17,
Chapter 20], [18]).
We now separately consider the cases λmax > 1 and λmax ≤
1.
Case: λmax > 1: We show that the choice
φ =
Heψmax
h
†
rψmax
(48)
in (45) yields (11), i.e., logλmax.
We begin by noting that since λmax > 1, the variational
characterization (2) establishes that ‖φ‖ < 1 and thus Kφ ∈
Kφ as defined in (10).
Then, provided that, with φ as given in (48), the right hand
side of (47) evaluates to
min
θ∈Cne
log
[
P‖hr−H†eθ‖2+1+‖θ‖2−2Re{θ†φ}
]
= log
(
λmax · (1− ‖φ‖2)
)
, (49)
we have
R+ ≤ max
KP∈KP
R+(KP ,Kφ)
= max
KP∈KP
h(yr|ye)− h(zr|ze)
≤ log(λmax · (1− ‖φ‖2))− log(1− ‖φ‖2)
= log(λmax),
9i.e., (11), as required. Verifying (49) with (48) is a straight-
forward computation, the details of which are provided in
Appendix II.
Case: λmax ≤ 1, He full column rank: We show that the
choice
φ = He(H
†
eHe)
−1hr (50)
in (45) yields (11), i.e., zero.
To verify that ‖φ‖ ≤ 1, first note that since λmax ≤ 1, it
follows from (2) that
λmax(I+Phrh
†
r , I+PH
†
eHe) ≤ 1⇔ λmax(hrh†r ,H†eHe) ≤ 1,
(51)
so that for any choice of ψ,
ψ†hrh
†
rψ ≤ ψ†H†eHeψ. (52)
Choosing ψ = (H†eHe)−1hr in (52) yields ‖φ‖2 ≤ ‖φ‖, i.e.,
‖φ‖ ≤ 1, as required.
Next, note that (47) is further upper bounded by choosing
any particular choice of θ. Choosing θ = φ yields
R+ ≤ log
(
P‖hr −H†eφ‖2
1− ‖φ‖2 + 1
)
(53)
which with the choice (50) for φ is zero.
Case: λmax ≤ 1, He not full column rank: Consider a new
MISOME channel with n′t < nt transmit antennas, where n′t
is the column rank of He, where the intended receiver and
eavesdropper channel gains are given by
gr = Q
†hr, Ge = HeQ, (54)
and where Q is a matrix whose columns constitute an orthog-
onal basis for the column space of H†e, so that in this new
channel Ge has full rank.
Then provided the new channel (54) has the same capacity
as the original channel, it follows by the analysis of the
previous case that the capacity of both channels is zero. Thus
it remains only to show the following.
Claim 1: The MISOME channel (gr,Ge) corresponding to
(54) has the same secrecy capacity as that corresponding to
(hr,He).
Proof: First we show that the new channel capacity is
no larger than the original one. In particular, we have
λmax(I+ Pgrg
†
r ,I+ PG
†
eGe)
= max
{ψ′:‖ψ′‖=1}
{
1 + P |g†rψ′|2
1 + P‖Geψ′‖2
}
(55)
= max
{ψ′:‖ψ′‖=1}
1 + P |h†rQψ′|2
1 + P‖HeQψ′‖2
(56)
= max
{ψ:ψ=Qψ′,‖ψ‖=1}
1 + P |h†rψ|2
1 + P‖Heψ‖2 (57)
≤ max
{ψ:‖ψ‖=1}
{
1 + P |h†rψ|2
1 + P‖Heψ‖2
}
(58)
= λmax(I+ Phrh
†
r , I+ PH
†
eHe), (59)
where to obtain (55) we have used (2) for the new channel, to
obtain (56) we have used (54), to obtain (57) we have used that
Q†Q = I, to obtain (58) we have used that we are maximizing
over a larger set, and to obtain (59) we have used (2) for the
original channel. Thus,
{
λmax(I+ Pgrg
†
r , I+ PG
†
eGe)
}+
≤ {λmax(I+ Phrh†r , I+ PH†eHe)}+ , (60)
Next, we show the new channel capacity is no smaller than
the original one. To begin, note that
Null(He) ⊆ Null(h†r), (61)
since if Null(He) * Null(h†r), then λmax(hrh†r ,H†eHe) =∞,
which would violate (51).
Proceeding, every x ∈ Cnt can we written as
x = Qx′ + x˜, (62)
where Hex˜ = 0 and thus, via (61), h†r x˜ = 0 as well. Hence,
we have that h†rx = g†rx′, Hex = Gex′, and ‖x′‖2 ≤ ‖x‖2,
so any rate achieved by px on the channel (hr,He) is also
achieved by px′ on the channel (gr,Ge), with px′ derived from
px via (62), whence{
λmax(I+ Pgrg
†
r , I+ PG
†
eGe)
}+
≥ {λmax(I+ Phrh†r , I+ PH†eHe)}+ . (63)
Combining (63) and (60) establishes our claim.
B. Proof of Corollary 1
We restrict our attention to the case λmax > 1 where the
capacity is nonzero. In this case, since, via (2),
λmax(I+Phrh
†
r , I+PH
†
eHe) =
1 + P |h†rψmax(P )|2
1 + P‖Heψmax(P )‖2
> 1,
(64)
where
ψmax(P ) , argmax
{ψ:‖ψ‖=1}
1 + P |h†rψ|2
1 + P‖Heψ‖2 , (65)
we have
|h†rψmax(P )| > ‖Heψmax(P )‖ (66)
for all P > 0.
To obtain an upper bound note that, for all P > 0,
λmax(I+ Phrh
†
r ,I+ PH
†
eHe)
≤ |h
†
rψmax(P )|2
‖Heψmax(P )‖2
(67)
≤ λmax(hrh†r ,H†eHe), (68)
where (67) follows from the Rayleigh quotient expansion (64)
and the fact that, due to (66), the right hand side of (64) is
increasing in P , and where (68) follows from (2). Thus, since
the right hand side of (68) is independent of P we have
lim
P→∞
λmax(I+ Phrh
†
r , I+ PH
†
eHe) ≤ λmax(hrh†r ,H†eHe).
(69)
Next, defining
ψmax(∞) , argmax
ψ
|h†rψ|2
‖Heψ‖2 , (70)
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we have the lower bound
lim
P→∞
λmax(I+ Phrh
†
r ,I+ PH
†
eHe)
≥ lim
P→∞
1/P + |h†rψmax(∞)|2
1/P + ‖Heψmax(∞)‖2(71)
= λmax(hrh
†
r ,H
†
eHe) (72)
where (71) follows from (2) and (72) follows from (70).
Since (69) and (72) coincide we obtain (12). Thus, to obtain
the remainder of (13a) we need only verify the following.
Claim 2: The high SNR capacity is finite, i.e.,
λmax(hrh
†
r ,H
†
eHe) <∞, when H⊥e hr = 0.
Proof: We argue by contradiction. Suppose
λmax(hrh
†
r ,H
†
eHe) = ∞. Then there must exist a sequence
ψk such that ‖Heψk‖ > 0 for each k = 1, 2, . . . , but
‖Heψk‖ → 0 as k → ∞. But then the hypothesis cannot
be true, because, as we now show, |h†rψ|2/‖Heψ‖2, when
viewed as a function of ψ, is bounded whenever the
denominator is nonzero.
Let ψ be any vector such that ‖Heψ‖ , δ > 0. It suffices
to show that
|h†rψ|2
‖Heψ‖2 ≤
‖hr‖2
σ2
, (73)
where σ2 is the smallest nonzero singular value of He.
To verify (73), we first express ψ in the form
ψ = cψ′ + dψ˜, (74)
where ψ′ and ψ˜ are unit vectors, c and d are real and
nonnegative, dψ˜ is the projection of ψ onto the null space
of He, and cψ′ is the projection of ψ onto the orthogonal
complement of this null space.
Next, we note that δ = ‖Heψ‖ = c‖Heψ′‖ ≥ cσ, whence
c ≤ δ
σ
. (75)
But since H⊥e hr = 0 it follows that h†rψ˜ = 0, so
|h†rψ|2 = c2|h†rψ′|2 ≤ c2‖hr‖2 ≤
δ2
σ2
‖hr‖2, (76)
where the first inequality follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality, and the second inequality is a simple substitution
from (75). Dividing through by ‖Heψ‖2 = δ2 in (76) yields
(73).
We now develop (13b) for the case where H⊥e hr 6= 0.
First, defining
S∞ = {ψ : ‖ψ‖ = 1, ‖Heψ‖ = 0} (77)
we obtain the lower bound
1
P
λmax(I+ Phrh
†
r , I+ PH
†
eHe)
≥ max
ψ∈S∞
1/P + |h†rψ|2
1 + P‖Heψ‖2
= max
ψ∈S∞
1
P
+ |h†rψ|2 (78)
=
1
P
+ ‖H⊥e hr‖2, (79)
where to obtain (79) we have used,
max
{ψ:‖ψ‖=1,Heψ=0}
∣∣h†rψ∣∣2 = ∥∥H⊥e hr∥∥2 . (80)
Next we develop an upper bound. We first establish the
following.
Claim 3: If H⊥e hr 6= 0 then there is a function ε(P ) such
that ε(P )→ 0 as P →∞, and
‖Heψmax(P )‖ ≤ ε(P ).
Proof: We have
1 + P‖hr‖2
1 + P‖Heψmax(P )‖2
≥ 1 + P |h
†
rψmax(P )|2
1 + P‖Heψmax(P )‖2
(81)
≥ max
{ψ:Heψ=0,‖ψ‖=1}
1 + P |h†rψ|2
1 + P‖Heψ‖2
(82)
= max
{ψ:Heψ=0,‖ψ‖=1}
(
1 + P |h†rψ|2
)
= 1 + P‖H⊥e hr‖2 (83)
where to obtain (81) we have used the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality |h†rψmax(P )|2 ≤ ‖hr‖2, to obtain (82) we have
used (65), and to obtain (83) we have used (80).
Rearranging (83) then gives
‖Heψmax(P )‖2 ≤
1
P
(
1 + P‖hr‖2
1 + P‖H⊥e hr‖2
− 1
)
, ε2(P ).
as desired.
Thus with SP = {ψ : ‖ψ‖ = 1, ‖Heψ‖ ≤ ε(P )} we have
1
P
λmax(I+ Phrh
†
r , I+ PH
†
eHe)
= max
ψ∈SP
1/P + |h†rψ|2
1 + P‖Heψ‖2 (84)
≤ max
ψ∈SP
1
P
+ |h†rψ|2, (85)
where (84) follows from (2) and Claim 3 that the maximizing
ψmax lies in SP .
Now, as we will show,
max
ψ∈SP
|h†rψ|2 ≤ ‖H⊥e hr‖2 +
ε2(P )
σ2
‖hr‖2. (86)
so using (86) in (85) we obtain
1
P
λmax(I+Phrh
†
r , I+ PH
†
eHe)
≤ ‖H⊥e hr‖2 +
ε2(P )
σ2
‖hr‖2 + 1
P
(87)
Finally, combining (87) and (79) we obtain
lim
P→∞
1
P
λmax(I+ Phrh
†
r , I+ PH
†
eHe) = ‖H⊥e hr‖2,
whence (13b).
Thus, it remains only to verify (86), which we do now.
We start by expressing ψ ∈ SP in the form [cf. (74)]
ψ = cψ′ + dψ˜, (88)
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where ψ′ and ψ˜ are unit vectors, c, d are real valued scalars in
[0, 1], dψ˜ is the projection of ψ onto the null space of He, and
cψ′ is the projection of ψ onto the orthogonal complement of
this null space.
With these definitions we have,
ε(P ) ≥ ‖Heψ‖ = c‖Heψ′‖ ≥ cσ (89)
since Heψ˜ = 0 and ‖Heψ′‖ ≥ σ.
Finally,
|h†rψ|2 = |dh†rψ˜ + ch†rψ′|2 (90)
= d2|h†rψ˜|2 + c2|h†rψ′|2 (91)
≤ |h†rψ˜|2 +
ε(P )2
σ2
|h†rψ′|2 (92)
≤ |h†rψ˜|2 +
ε(P )2
σ2
‖hr‖2 (93)
≤ ‖H⊥e hr‖2 +
ε(P )2
σ2
‖hr‖2, (94)
where (90) follows from substituting (88), (91) follows from
the fact that ψ′ and ψ˜ are orthogonal, (92) follows from using
(89) to bound c2, and (94) follows from the fact that Heψ˜ = 0
and (80).
C. Proof of Corollary 2
We consider the limit P → 0. In the following steps, the
order notation O(P ) means that O(P )/P → 0 as P → 0.
λmax(I+ Phrh
†
r , I+ PH
†
eHe) (95)
= λmax
(
(I+ PH†eHe)
−1(I+ Phrh
†
r)
) (96)
= λmax
(
(I− PH†eHe + O(P ))(I + Phrh†r)
) (97)
= λmax
(
(I− PH†eHe)(I+ Phrh†r)
)
+ O(P ) (98)
= λmax
(
I+ P (hrh
†
r −H†eHe)
)
+ O(P ) (99)
= 1 + Pλmax(hrh
†
r −H†eHe) + O(P ), (100)
where (96) follows from the definition of generalized eigen-
value, (97) follows from the Taylor series expansion of (I +
PH†eHe)
−1
, where we have assumed that P is sufficiently
small so that all eigenvalues of PH†eHe are less than unity,
(98) and (99) follow from the continuity of the eigenvalue
function in its arguments and (100) follows from the property
of eigenvalue function that λ(I+A) = 1 + λ(A).
In turn, we have,
C(P )
P
=
log(1 + Pλmax(hrh
†
r −H†eHe) + O(P ))
P
(101)
=
λmax(hrh
†
r −H†eHe)
ln 2
+
O(P )
P
, (102)
where to obtain (101) we have used (100) in (11), and to
obtain (102) we have used Taylor Series expansion of the ln(·)
function.
Finally, taking the limit P → 0 in (102) yields (14) as
desired.
VII. MASKED BEAMFORMING SCHEME ANALYSIS
From Csisza´r-Ko¨rner [2], secrecy rate R = I(u; yr) −
I(u; ye) is achievable for any choice of pu and px|u that
satisfy the power constraint E[|x |2] ≤ P . While a capacity-
achieving scheme corresponds to maximizing this rate over
the choice of pu and px|u (cf. (6)), the masked beamforming
scheme corresponds to different (suboptimal) choice of these
distributions. In particular, we choose
pu = CN(0, P˜ ) and px|u = CN(uh˜r, P˜ (I− h˜rh˜†r), (103)
where we have chosen the convenient normalizations
P˜ =
P
nt
(104)
and
h˜r =
hr
‖hr‖ . (105)
In this form, the secrecy rate of masked beamforming is
readily obtained, as we now show
A. Proof of Proposition 1
With pu and px|u as in (103), we evaluate (6). To this end,
first we have
I(u; yr) = log(1 + P˜‖hr‖2) (106)
Then, to evaluate I(u; ye), note that
h(ye) = log det(I+ P˜HeH
†
e)
h(ye|u) = log det(I+ P˜He(I− h˜rh˜†r)H†e)
so
I(u;ye)
= h(ye)− h(ye|u)
= log det(I+P˜HeH
†
e)−log det(I+ P˜He(I−h˜rh˜†r)H†e)
= log det(I+P˜H†eHe)−log det(I+ P˜ (I−h˜rh˜†r)H†eHe)
= log det(I+ P˜H†eHe)
− log det(I+ P˜H†eHe−P˜ h˜rh˜†rH†eHe)
= − log det
(
I− P˜ h˜rh˜†rH†eHe(I+ P˜H†eHe)−1
)
= − log
(
1− P˜ h˜†rH†eHe(I+ P˜H†eHe)−1h˜r
)
= − log
(
h˜†r(I+ P˜H
†
eHe)
−1h˜r
)
, (107)
where we have repeatedly used the matrix identity det(I +
AB) = det(I+BA) valid for any A and B with compatible
dimensions.
Thus, combining (106) and (107) we obtain (15) as desired:
RMB(P )
= I(u; yr)− I(u; ye)
= log(1 + P˜‖hr‖2) + log(h˜†r(I+ P˜H†eHe)−1h˜r)
= log
(
1+
1
P˜‖hr‖2
)
+ log(P˜h†r(I+ P˜H
†
eHe)
−1hr)
= log
(
1+
1
P˜‖hr‖2
)
+ log(λmax(P˜hrh
†
r , I+P˜H
†
eHe)),
where to obtain the last equality we have used the special form
(3) for the largest generalized eigenvalue.
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B. Proof of Theorem 3
First, from Theorem 2 and Proposition 1 we have, with
again P˜ as in (104) for convenience,
C
(
P
nt
)
−RMB(P ) ≤ log λmax(I+ P˜hrh
†
r , I+ P˜H
†
eHe)
λmax(P˜hrh
†
r , I+ P˜H
†
eHe)
.
(108)
Next, with ψmax denoting the generalized eigenvector cor-
responding to λmax(I+ P˜hrh†r , I+ P˜H†eHe), we have
λmax(I+ P˜hrh
†
r , I+ P˜H
†
eHe) =
1 + P˜ |h†rψmax|2
1 + P˜‖Heψmax‖2(109)
λmax(P˜hrh
†
r , I+ P˜H
†
eHe) ≥
P˜ |h†rψmax|2
1 + P˜‖Heψmax‖2(110)
(111)
Finally, substituting (109) and (110) into (108), we obtain
0 ≤ C
(
P
nt
)
−RMB(P ) ≤ log
(
1 +
nt
P |h†rψmax|2
)
, (112)
the right hand side of which approaches zero as P → ∞,
whence (16) as desired.
VIII. SCALING LAWS DEVELOPMENT
We begin by summarizing a few well-known results from
random matrix theory that will be useful in our scaling laws;
for further details, see, e.g., [19].
A. Some Random Matrix Properties
Three basic facts will suffice for our purposes.
Fact 4: Suppose that v is a random length-n complex vector
with independent, zero-mean, variance-1/n elements, and that
B is a random n × n complex positive semidefinite matrix
distributed independently of v. Then if the spectrum of B
converges we have
lim
n→∞
v†(I+ γB)−1v
a.s.
= ηB(γ), (113)
where ηB(γ) is the η-transform [19] of the matrix B.
Of particular interest to us is the η-transform of a special
class of matrices below.
Fact 5: Suppose that H ∈ CK×N is random matrix whose
entries are i.i.d. with variance 1/N . As K,N → ∞ with the
ratio K/N , β fixed, the η-transform of B = H†H is given
by
ηH†H(γ) =
ξ(γ, β)
γ
, (114)
where ξ(·, ·) is as defined in (21).
The distribution of generalized eigenvalues of the pair
(hrh
†
r ,H
†
eHe) is also known [20], [21]. For our purposes, the
following is sufficient.
Fact 6: Suppose that hr and He have i.i.d. CN(0, 1) entries,
and ne > nt. Then
λmax(hrh
†
r ,H
†
eHe) ∼
2nt
2ne − 2nt + 1F2nt,2ne−2nt+1, (115)
where F2nt,2ne−2nt+1 is the F-distribution with 2nt and 2ne−
2nt + 1 degrees of freedom, i.e.,
F2nt,2ne−2nt+1
d
=
v1/(2nt)
v2/(2ne − 2nt + 1) , (116)
where d= denote equality in distribution, and where v1 and v2
are independent chi-squared random variables with 2nt and
2ne − 2nt + 1 degrees of freedom, respectively.
Using Fact 6 it follows that with β = ne/nt fixed,
lim
nt→∞
λmax(hrh
†
r ,H
†
eHe)
a.s.
=
1
β − 1 , when β > 1. (117)
Indeed, from the strong law of large numbers we have that the
random variables v1 and v2 in (116) satisfy, for β > 1,
lim
nt→∞
v1
2nt
a.s.
= 1, and lim
nt→∞
v2
2nt(β − 1) + 1
a.s.
= 1 (118)
Combining (118) with (116) yields (117).
B. Proof of Theorem 4
First, from Theorem 2 we have that
C(P, nt, ne) =
{
logλmax(I+ Phrh
†
r , I+ PH
†
eHe)
}+
≥ {logλmax(Phrh†r , I+ PH†eHe)}+
=
{
log
(
Ph†r(I+ PH
†
eHe)
−1hr
)}+
, (119)
where (119) follows from the quadratic form representation
(3) of the generalized eigenvalue.
Rewriting (119) using the notation
h˜r =
1√
nt
hr, and H˜e =
1√
nt
He, (120)
we then obtain (20) as desired:
C˜(γ, β) = C(γ/nt, nt, βnt)
≥
{
log
(
γh˜r(I+ γH˜
†
eH˜e)
−1h˜r
)}+
a.s.−→ {log ξ(γ, β)}+ as nt →∞, (121)
where to obtain (121) we have applied (113) and (114).
The derivation of the scaling law (22) for the masked
beamforming scheme is analogous. Indeed, from Proposition 1
we have
RMB(γ, nt, βnt) ≥
{
logλmax(γh˜rh˜
†
r , I+ γH˜
†
eH˜e)
}+
=
{
log
(
γh˜†r(I+ γH˜
†
eH˜e)
−1h˜r
)}+
a.s.−→ {log ξ(γ, β)}+ as nt →∞,
where as above the last line comes from applying (113) and
(114).
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C. Proof of Theorem 5
When β < 1 (i.e., ne < nt), we have H⊥e hr 6= 0 almost
surely, so (13b) holds, i.e.,
lim
P→∞
C(P ) =∞ (122)
as (23) reflects.
When β ≥ 1 (i.e., ne > nt) H†eHe is nonsingular almost
surely, (13a) holds, i.e.,
lim
P→∞
C(P ) =
{
logλ(hrh
†
r ,H
†
eHe)
}+
.
Taking the limit ne, nt →∞ with ne/nt = β fixed, and using
(117), we obtain
lim
nt→∞
lim
P→∞
C(P ) = {− log(β − 1)}+
as (23) asserts.
Furthermore, via (16) we have that
lim
P→∞
RMB(P ) =
{
logλ(hrh
†
r ,H
†
eHe)
}+
= lim
P→∞
C(P ),
whence (24).
IX. FADING CHANNEL ANALYSIS
We prove the lower and upper bounds of Theorem 6
separately.
A. Proof of (27a)
By viewing the fading channel as a set of parallel channels
indexed by the channel gain hr of the intended receiver8 and
the eavesdropper’s observation as (ye,He), the rate
R = I(u; yr | hr)− I(u; ye,He | hr). (123)
is achievable for any choice of pu|hr and px|u,hr that satisfies
the power constraint E[ρ(hr)] ≤ P . We choose distributions
corresponding to an adaptive version of masked beamforming,
i.e., [cf. (103)]
pu|hr = CN(0, ρ˜(hr)), px|u,hr = CN
(
uh˜r, ρ˜(hr)(I− h˜rh˜†r)
)
,
(124)
where we have chosen the convenient normalizations [cf. (104)
and (105)]
ρ˜(hr) ,
ρ(hr)
nt
(125)
and
h˜r =
hr
‖hr‖ . (126)
Evaluating (123) with the distributions (124) yields (27a)
with (29a):
I(u;yr | hr)− I(u; ye,He | hr) (127)
= E[log(1 + ρ˜(hr)‖hr‖2)]
+ E[log(h˜†r(I+ ρ˜(hr)H
†
eHe)
−1h˜r)] (128)
= E
[
log
(
1 +
1
ρ˜(hr)‖hr‖2
)]
+ E
[
log
(
ρ˜(hr)h
†
r(I+ ρ˜(hr)H
†
eHe)
−1hr
)]
, (129)
8Since the fading coefficients are continuous valued, one has to discretize
these coefficients before mapping to parallel channels. By choosing appropri-
ately fine quantization levels one can approach the rate as closely as possible.
See e.g., [9] for a discussion.
where the steps leading to (128) are analogous to those used
in Section VII-A for the nonfading case and hence have been
omitted.
B. Proof of (27b)
Suppose that there is a sequence of (2nR, n) codes such
that for a sequence εn (with εn → 0 as n→∞),
1
n
H(w)− 1
n
H(w |yne ,Hne , hnr ) ≤ εn,
Pr(wˆ 6= w) ≤ εn.
(130)
1) An auxiliary channel: We now introduce another chan-
nel for which the noise vaiables zr(t) and ze(t) are correlated,
but the conditions in (130) still hold. Hence any rate achievable
on the original channel is also achievable on this new channel.
In what follows, we will upper bound the rate achievable for
this new channel instead of the original channel.
We begin by introducing some notation. Let,
ρt(h
t
r) , E
[‖x(t)‖2 ∣∣ htr = htr] (131)
denote the transmitted power at time t, when the channel
realization of the intended receiver from time 1 to t is htr. Note
that ρt(·) satisfies the long term average power constraint i.e.,
Ehn
r
[
1
n
n∑
t=1
ρt(h
t
r)
]
≤ P. (132)
Next, let, phr and pHe denote the density functions of hr and
He, respectively, and let pzr and pze denote the density function
of the noise random variables in our channel model (26).
Observe that the constraints in (130) (and hence the capacity)
depend only on the distributions pzn
e
,hn
r
,Hn
e
(zne ,h
n
r ,H
n
e ) and
pzn
r
,hn
r
(znr ,h
n
r ). Furthermore since the channel model (26) is
memoryless and (hr,He) are i.i.d. and mutually independent,
we have
pzn
e
,hn
r
,Hn
e
(zne ,h
n
r ,H
n
e ) =
n∏
t=1
pze(ze(t))phr(hr(t))pHe(He(t)), (133)
pzn
r
,hn
r
(znr ,h
n
r ) =
n∏
t=1
pzr(zr(t))phr(hr(t)). (134)
Let Pt denote the set of conditional-joint distributions
p
zr(t),ze(t)|hnr ,H
n
e
with fixed conditional-marginals, i.e.,
Pt =
{
p
zr(t),ze(t)|hnr ,H
n
e
(zr, ze | hnr ,Hne )
∣∣
p
zr(t)|hnr ,H
n
e
(zr | hnr ,Hne ) = pzr(zr),
pze(t)|hnr ,Hne (ze | hnr ,Hne ) = pze(ze)
}
. (135)
Suppose that for each t = 1, 2, . . . , n we select a distribution
p
zr(t),ze(t)|hnr ,H
n
e
∈ Pt and consider a channel with distribution
pzn
r
,zn
e
,hn
r
,Hn
e
(znr , z
n
e ,h
n
r ,H
n
e ) =
n∏
t=1
p
zr(t),ze(t)|hnr ,H
n
e
(zr(t),ze(t)|hnr ,Hne)phr(hr(t))pHe(He(t)).
(136)
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This new channel distribution has noise variables (zr(t), ze(t))
correlated, where the correlation is possibly time-dependent,
but from (135) and (136), note that znr and zne are marginally
Gaussian and i.i.d., and satisfy (133) and (134). Hence the
conditions in (130) are satisfied for this channel and the rate
R is achievable.
In the sequel we select p
zr(t),ze(t)|hnr ,H
n
e
(zr, ze | hnr ,Hne )
to be the worst case noise distribution for the Gaussian
channel with gains hr(t), and, He(t), and power of ρt(htr) in
Theorem 2 i.e., if ψt is the eigenvector corresponding to the
largest generalized eigenvalue λmax(I+ρt(htr)hr(t)hr(t)†, I+
ρt(h
t
r)H
†
e(t)He(t)),
p
zr(t),ze(t)|hnr ,H
n
e
= CN
(
0,
[
1 φ†t
φt I
])
, where (137)
φt =
{
1
h
†
r (t)ψt
(He(t)ψt), λmax ≥ 1,
Ge(t)(G
†
e(t)Ge(t))
−1gr(t), λmax < 1,
and where Ge(t) and gr(t) are related to He(t) and hr(t)
as in (54). Our choice of p
zr(t),ze(t)|hnr ,H
n
e
is such that
(zr(t), ze(t)) only depend on the (He(t), hr(t), ρt(htr)) i.e.,
(Hne , h
n
r )→ (ρ(htr), hr(t),He(t))→ (zr(t), ze(t)) (138)
forms a Markov chain.
2) Upper bound on the auxiliary channel: We now upper
bound the secrecy rate for the channel (136). Note that this
also upper bounds the rate on the original channel.
From Fano’s inequality, that there exists a sequence ε′n such
that ε′n → 0 as n→∞, and,
1
n
H(w |ynr , hnr ) ≤ ε′n.
nR = H(w) = I(w ; ynr | hnr ) + nε′n
= I(w ; ynr | hnr )− I(w ; yne ,Hne | hnr ) + n(εn + ε′n)
(139)
≤ I(w ; ynr | hnr ,Hne , yne ) + n(εn + ε′n)
≤ I(xn; ynr | hnr ,Hne , yne ) + n(εn + ε′n) (140)
≤
n∑
t=1
I(x(t); yr(t) | Hne , hnr , ye(t)) + n(εn + ε′n), (141)
where (139) follows from the secrecy condition (c.f. (130)),
and (140) follows from the Markov relation w ↔
(xn, yne , h
n
r ,H
n
e ) ↔ ynr , and (141) holds because for the
channel (136) we have
h(ynr |yne ,Hne , hnr , xn) =
n∑
t=1
h(yr(t)|ye(t), hnr ,Hne , x(t)).
We next upper bound the term I(x(t); yr(t) | ye(t),Hne , hnr )
in (141) for each t = 1, 2, . . . , n.
I(x(t); yr(t) | ye(t),Hne , hnr )
≤ I(x(t); yr(t) | ye(t),He(t), hr(t), ρt(htr)) (142)
≤ E[{logλmax(I+ ρt(htr)hr(t)h†r(t),
I+ ρt(h
t
r)H
†
e(t)He(t))}+], (143)
where (142) follows from the fact that (c.f. (138)),
(Hne , h
n
r )→ (x(t), ρt(htr), hr(t),He(t))→ (yr(t), ye(t))
forms a Markov chain and (143) follows since our choice of
the noise distribution in (137) is the worst case noise in (7)
for the Gaussian channel with gains hr(t), He(t) and power
ρt(h
t
r), hence the derivation in Theorem 2 applies.
Substituting (143) into (141) we have,
nR− n(εn + ε′n)
=
n∑
t=1
EHe(t),htr
[{
log λmax(I+ ρt(h
t
r)hr(t)h
†
r(t),
I+ ρt(h
t
r)H
†
e(t)He(t))
}+] (144)
≤
n∑
t=1
EHe(t),hr(t)
[{
log λmax(I+ Eht−1r [ρt(h
t
r)]hr(t)h
†
r(t),
I+ Eht−1r [ρt(h
t
r)]H
†
e(t)He(t))
}+] (145)
=
n∑
t=1
EHe(t),hr(t)
[{
log λmax(I+ ρˆt(hr(t))hr(t)h
†
r(t),
I+ ρˆt(hr(t))H
†
e(t)He(t))
}+] (146)
=
n∑
t=1
EHe,hr [{logλmax(I+ ρˆt(hr)hrh†r , I+ ρˆt(hr)H†eHe)}+]
(147)
≤ nEHe,hr
[{
logλmax(I+
n∑
t=1
1
n
ρˆt(hr)hrh
†
r ,
I+
n∑
t=1
1
n
ρˆt(hr)H
†
eHe)
}+] (148)
= nEHe,hr [{logλmax(I+ ρ(hr)hrh†r , I+ ρ(hr)H†eHe)}+]
(149)
where (145) and (148) follow from Jensen’s inequality since
C(P ) = {logλmax(I + Phrh†r , I + PH†eHe)}+ is a capacity
and therefore concave in P , (146) follows by defining
ρˆt(hr) = Eht−1r [ρt(h
t
r)], (150)
(147) follows from the fact that the distribution of both hr
and He does not depend on t, and (149) follows by defining
ρ(hr) =
1
n
∑n
t=1 ρˆt(hr).
To complete the proof, note that
Ehr [ρ(hr)] =
1
n
n∑
t=1
Ehr [ρˆt(hr)]
=
1
n
n∑
t=1
Eht
r
[ρt(h
t
r)] (151)
=
1
n
n∑
t=1
Ehn
r
[ρt(h
t
r)] ≤ P, (152)
where (151) follows from (150) and the fact that the channel
gains are i.i.d., and (152) follows from (132).
C. Proof of Proposition 2
The proof is immediate from Theorems 4, 5 and 6.
For the lower bound, we only consider the case when
log ξ(P, β) > 0, since otherwise the rate is zero. We select
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ρ(hr) = P to be fixed for each hr. Then we have from
Theorem 4 that
RFF,−(hr,He, P )
a.s.−→ log ξ(P, β).
Finally since almost-sure convergence implies convergence in
expectation,
lim
nt→∞
E[RFF,−(hr,He, P )] = log ξ(P, β),
which establishes the lower bound (30). For the upper bound,
since
RFF,+(hr,He, P ) =
{
logλmax(I+Phrh
†
r,I+ PH
†
eHe)
}+
,
we have from Theorem 5 that
lim
nt→∞
RFF,+(hr,He, P )
a.s.≤ C˜(∞, β), (153)
and hence
lim
nt→∞
CFF (P = γ, nt, ne = βnt) ≤ lim
nt→∞
E[RFF,+(hr,He, γ)]
≤ C˜(∞, β),
where we again use the fact that almost sure convergence
implies convergence in expectation.
X. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The present work characterizes the key performance char-
acteristics and tradeoffs inherent in communication over the
MISOME channel. There are many opportunities for further
work. As one example, stronger results (i.e., tighter bounds)
for the fast fading case would be quite useful. As another
example would be extending the results to the general MI-
MOME channel. For the latter, the high SNR regime has been
characterized [10] using generalized singular value analysis,
and the details will be reported elsewhere.
More generally, many recent architectures for wireless sys-
tems exploit the knowledge of the channel at the physical
layer in order to increase the system throughput and reliability.
Many of these systems have a side benefit of providing
security. It is naturally of interest to quantify these gains and
identify potential applications.
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APPENDIX I
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Suppose there exists a sequence of (2nR, n) codes such that
for every ε > 0, and n sufficiently large we have that
Pr(w 6= wˆ) ≤ ε, (154)
1
n
I(w ; yne ) ≤ ε, (155)
1
n
n∑
i=1
E[‖x(i)‖2] ≤ P. (156)
We first note that (154) implies, from Fano’s inequality,
1
n
I(w ; ynr ) ≥ R − εF, (157)
where εF → 0 as ε→ 0. Combining (155) and (157), we have
for ε′ = ε+ εF:
nR− nε′ ≤ I(w ; ynr )− I(w ; yne )
≤ I(w ; ynr , yne )− I(w ; yne ) (158)
= I(w ; ynr |yne ) (159)
= h(ynr |yne )− h(ynr |yne ,w)
≤ h(ynr |yne )− h(ynr |yne ,w , xn) (160)
= h(ynr |yne )− h(ynr |yne , xn) (161)
=h(ynr |yne )−
n∑
t=1
h(yr(t)|ye(t), x(t)) (162)
≤
n∑
t=1
h(yr(t)|ye(t))−
n∑
t=1
h(yr(t)|ye(t), x(t))
= nI(x; yr|ye, q) (163)
≤ nI(x; yr|ye), (164)
where (158) and (159) each follow from the chain of mutual
information, (160) follows from the fact that conditioning
cannot increase differential entropy, (161) follows from the
Markov relation w ↔ (xn, yne ) ↔ ynr , and (162) follows
from the fact the channel is memoryless. Moreover, (163) is
obtained by defining a time-sharing random variable q that
takes values uniformly over the index set {1, 2, . . . , n} and
defining (x, yr, ye) to be the tuple of random variables that
conditioned on q = t, have the same joint distribution as
(x(t), yr(t), ye(t)). It then follows that for our choice of x and
given (156), E[‖x‖2] ≤ P . Finally, (164) follows from the fact
that I(x; yr|ye) is concave in px (see, e.g., [9, Appendix I] for
a proof), so that Jensen’s inequality can be applied.
APPENDIX II
DERIVATION OF (49)
The argument of the logarithm on left hand side of (49)
is convex in θ, so it is straightforward to verify that the
minimizing θ is
θ = (I+ PHeH
†
e)
−1(PHehr + φ). (165)
In the sequel, we exploit that by the definition of generalized
eigenvalues via (1),
(I+ Phrh
†
r)ψmax = λmax(I+ PH
†
eHe)ψmax, (166)
or, rearranging,
(
hrh
†
r − λmaxH†eHe
)
ψmax =
(λmax − 1)
P
· ψmax. (167)
First we obtain a more convenient expression for θ as
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follows:
θ = (I+ PHeH
†
e)
−1
(
PHehr +
1
h
†
rψmax
Heψmax
)
(168)
= (I+ PHeH
†
e)
−1He(Phrh
†
r + I)ψmax
h
†
rψmax
= (I+ PHeH
†
e)
−1 λmaxHe(PH
†
eHe + I)ψmax
h
†
rψmax
(169)
= (I+ PHeH
†
e)
−1 λmax · (PHeH†e + I)Heψmax
h
†
rψmax
(170)
= λmaxφ, (171)
where (168) follows from substituting (48) into (165), and
(169) follows from substituting via (166).
Next we have that
hr −H†eθ = hr −
λmax
h
†
rψmax
H†eHeψmax (172)
=
(hrh
†
r − λmaxH†eHe)ψmax
h
†
rψmax
=
(λmax − 1)ψmax
Ph†rψmax
(173)
(174)
where (172) follows from substituting from (171) with (48),
and (173) follows by substituting (167). Thus,
P‖hr −H†eθ‖2 = (λmax − 1)
[
(λmax − 1)
P |h†rψmax|2
]
. (175)
To simplify (175) further, we exploit that
1− λmax‖φ‖2 = 1− λmaxψ
†
maxH
†
eHeψmax
ψ†maxhrh
†
rψmax
(176)
=
ψ†max(hrh
†
r − λmaxH†eHe)ψmax
|h†rψmax|2
=
(λmax − 1)
P |h†rψmax|2
, (177)
where (176) follows by again substituting from (48), and (177)
follows by again substituting from (167). In turn, replacing the
term in brackets in (175) according to (177) then yields
P‖hr −H†eθ‖2 = (λmax − 1)(1− λmax‖φ‖2). (178)
Finally, substituting (178) then (171) into the left hand side
of (49) yields, following some minor algebra, the right hand
side as desired.
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